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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The State asserts that courts have a "wide range of discretion in determining whether 
newly discovered evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial." (Brief of Appellee at 10) 
(quoting State v. Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). In support of its assertion, 
the State cites to State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), which states that "[a]t the 
extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a decision by the trial court to grant or deny 
a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence." However, the question of sufficiency of 
evidence presented at trial is separate and apart from the question of whether newly 
discovered evidence meets the legal standard justifying a new trial. Whether newly 
discovered evidence meets the legal standard is not at "the extreme end of the discretion 
spectrum" as the State maintains. Moreover, Defendant does not merely challenge the 
district court's application of the facts to the legal standard. Defendant maintains that the 
district court judge improperly applied the legal standard in weighing the credibility of the 
new evidence. Thus, the question raised falls more at the legal end of the spectrum than at 
the factual end. 
The State also fails to acknowledge that the standard for an appeal challenging the 
refusal to give jury instructions presents a question of law only and is reviewed de novo. See 
State v. Peterson, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah App. 1990). Instead, the State improperly 
inserts its argument on the merits that Defendant waived any right to a lesser offense 
instruction. 
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As to the ultimate legal question of whether the defendant has received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the appropriate standard of 
review is de novo. See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 
(Utah 1994) (applying legal principles to determine whether defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and showing no deference to whatever action the trial court took in its 
application of law). 
The State argues that the denial of a new trial based upon a failure to provide 
exculpatory evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. While this may be true, the 
State has the burden to "persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent 
the error, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable for the defendant," State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,917 (Utah 1987), and whether the trial court applied the proper legal 
standards to the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is reviewed for 
correctness, see State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 28, 979 P.2d 799, 811. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PRE JUDICIAL ERROR IN IMPROPER-
LY WEIGHING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NEW EVIDENCE. 
The State argues that the trial court properly found that the newly discovered evidence 
would not likely have resulted in a different outcome at trial. (See Brief of Appellee at 10.) 
The State further alleges that Defendant does not challenge the legal standard applied by the 
district court, only the court's ruling that the evidence would not likely result in a different 
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verdict. (See id. at 11 n.2.) However, Defendant maintains that the district court improperly 
applied the legal standard in weighing the credibility of the new evidence and finding that 
it was insufficient to show the probability of a different verdict.1 Moreover, the new 
evidence meets the legal standard and warrants the granting of a new trial. 
A. The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Error in Misapplying the Legal 
Standard in Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
When evaluating new evidence to determine whether it meets the legal standard 
requiring a new trial, it is improper for the trial court to weigh the credibility or assess the 
believability of the new evidence. See State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1942). 
Rather, the court should determine whether a different result would be probable if the jury 
were to believe the Defendant's new evidence. 
In this case, the trial court improperly weighed the credibility of the new evidence, 
stating, "Mr. Valdez's credibility certainly can be questioned by the terms of the interviews. 
He was sick, looking for a fix to get better." (R. 1255:89.) The issue of credibility is one 
indeed, despite a trial court having great discretion in deciding whether new 
evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial, see State v. Goddard, 871 
P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994), Judge Thome felt bound by the outcome of the trial as 
indicated by his comments during the proceedings on Defendant's motion for new trial. 
Judge Thorne stated that "I feel a little bit handicapped ruling on post trial motions for a 
trial that I didn't conduct. And so that, I think, may limit some of what ordinarily is fairly 
broad discretion that a trial judge has in terms of granting post trial motions." (R. 
1255:85.) Defendant was entitled to that broad discretion in presenting his new evidence 
before the trial court. Hence, because Judge Thome's review of the new evidence was 
"limited," this Court should look closely at the newly discovered evidence and other 
issues presented to determine whether confidence in the jury verdict is undermined. 
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that should have been presented to the jury. Instead of the trial judge deciding whether he 
believed the testimony of the new witness, Mr. Valdez, he should have asked the question: 
"If the jury believed the testimony of Mr. Valdez, is there a reasonable probability of a 
different result in the trial?" In essence, the trial court assumed the role of the jury, took the 
issue of credibility out of the jury's hands, and decided the evidence was biased or 
untrustworthy. 
The trial court also improperly evaluated the new evidence of Gilmar Pinelo, who 
stated to the Defendant that he was present in the park on April 26, 1993 and that he was 
there to back up Lopez and help him kill the Defendant. (See R. 1014-15.) The trial court 
stated that "I hadn't been presented with any indication that Pinelo is willing or has in the 
past presented evidence that would be admissible at trial to talk about his role in striking Mr. 
Whiteman ... or in backing up Mr. Lopez, or Mr. Gomez." (R. 1255:88.) Indeed, it now 
appears that Mr. Pinelo is not willing to confirm what he told the Defendant. However, such 
evidence should have been presented to the jury in the form of impeachment evidence, and 
the jury could then decide whether they believed Pinelo's earlier statement or later 
recantation. 
With regard to the new evidence of the victim's Surenos gang affiliation, the trial 
court found that "it was not information specifically that Mr. Whiteman had at the time of 
the confrontation. And as such, it is not relevant to his mental state at the time he was 
defending himself, and as such would not rise to the level of a probable different result." (R. 
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1255:90.) However, Defendant Whiteman believed he was being attacked by a group and 
not just by one person. (SeeR. 1253: 110-17.) Moreover, the new evidence of the victim's 
gang affiliation, including the testimony of Chuck Gilbert, not only confirms that testimony, 
but would also have impeached Officer Robinson's testimony that there was not an organized 
group in the park and other witnesses who thought that the victim acted alone on April 26. 
Thus, the evidence would have been significant to the jury for multiple reasons, not just to 
confirm the Defendant's belief that the victim was involved in a violent organization. 
Finally, the trial court did not even address the new evidence regarding Robert Young, 
the State's key eyewitness. Subsequent to the trial, the Defendant discovered Mr. Young's 
DUI charge, his request for leniency in exchange for his testimony, the State's waiver of his 
$300 fine and 150 hours community service, and his being in violation of probation in 
connection with the DUI charge. The trial court made no finding as to this newly discovered 
evidence. As the Defendant has consistently maintained, this evidence should have been 
presented to the jury to impeach Mr. Young's credibility and truthfulness, as well as his 
character. 
This newly discovered evidence, when considered collectively and under the proper 
legal standard, would likely have produced a different result in the trial. If the trial court had 
properly determined its evidentiary value in the event that the jury believes the new evidence 
as the Defendant presents it. it would have found that an acquittal for the Defendant was 
reasonably probable. Because Judge Thorne improperly applied the legal standard, and 
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because the judge presiding over the trial is no longer on the bench, this Court stands in the 
same position as Judge Thorne did and should find that the new evidence meets the legal 
standard, remanding the case for a new trial. 
B. The Newly Discovered Evidence Was Not Reasonably Available Prior to 
Trial, Was Not Merely Cumulative, and Would Render a Different Result 
Probable. 
The State contends that the trial court properly found that the Defendant's proffered 
new evidence was insufficient to justify a new trial. (See Brief of Appellee at 11.) However, 
when considered properly under the appropriate legal standard, the new evidence meets the 
criteria warranting a new trial. 
1. Evidence of Lopez' gang involvement and membership. 
The State maintains that the evidence of the victim's gang membership and the 
existence of the Surenos gang is "entirely cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial 
concerning defendant's association with other Hispanics at the park." (Brief of Appellee at 
12-16.) However, the State is unable to point to any evidence whatsoever in the trial record 
of evidence that was presented regarding the Surenos gang and the victim's membership and 
involvement in the gang. This is because no such evidence was presented. Thus, the new 
evidence now offered cannot be deemed "merely cumulative." 
The state further argues that the evidence of the victim's tattoos manifesting 
membership in the Surenos gang was known prior to trial and disclosed to Defendant. (See 
id.) (citing to Affidavit of Mark Moffat, ^ 12 (R. 887)). However, even if the medical report 
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illustrating the tattoos was disclosed to Defendant's counsel, Defendant was unaware of such 
evidence until after the conclusion of trial and was never consulted as to whether the 
evidence would be offered. (R. 1013-14.) 
The State suggests that the only new evidence proffered by Defendant relating to the 
victim's gang affiliation is the affidavit of Officer Chuck Gilbert. (See Brief of Appellee at 
12.) Regarding Officer Gilbert's affidavit, the State argues that it "does not offer any 
specific evidence about the victim in this case, or about the extent of the victim's 
involvement in the Surenos gang in 1993. ... Gilbert's affidavit does not appear to be 
admissible evidence, as it reflects his speculation about what he thought gang activity might 
have been in 1993, based upon his later involvement in the Metro Gang Unit." (Id. at 12-13.) 
However, Gilbert need not testify from personal knowledge as to the victim's specific 
conduct and any facts alleged in Gilbert's affidavit must be deemed true for the purpose of 
ruling on a motion for new trial. See State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1942) ("If 
there is nothing offered to controvert the affidavits as to evidence newly discovered by the 
moving party, for purposes of ruling on the motion for a new trial, the court must assume that 
the facts alleged in the affidavits will be produced in court....") (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Court must deem as true the fact that the Surenos gang was the largest 
and most active gang in the Salt Lake City area in the early 1990fs and that Surenos gang 
members are known to be violent, having no regard for their own lives, and provoke 
situations and confrontations that can result in their own deaths to protect other gang 
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members. (R. 793-94.) Moreover, Surenos gang members are often involved in drug 
trafficking, working in groups of three to five gang members. (R. 795.) This evidence, 
together with the evidence of the tattoos, confirms the Defendant's testimony that the victim 
was involved in some type of organized gang activity and impeaches the testimony of Officer 
Robinson and other witnesses who stated that there was not an organized group operating in 
the Pioneer Park area. Finally, contrary to what the State asserts, it is not necessary that 
Officer Gilbert be a member of the Metro Gang Unit at the time of the incident. As part of 
his duties in the present is to study gang activity and patterns from the past, including such 
material as that attached to his affidavit. (R. 796-98.) The fact that he was not a member of 
the gang unit at the time of the incident is an issue which the State may bring out on cross 
examination, but does not render Officer Gilbert's testimony inadmissible. 
The new evidence of the victim's gang affiliation and evidence surrounding the 
activities of the Surenos gang activity was not available to defendant prior to trial, it was not 
merely cumulative of other evidence, and it would with reasonable probability have rendered 
a more favorable result for the Defendant had it been presented to the jury. This Court 
should, therefore, remand this case, granting the Defendant a new trial. 
2. Testimony of Julian Valdez. 
The State argues that the trial court properly found that the testimony of Julian Valdez 
was insufficient to justify granting a new trial. The State refers to three reasons for which 
the trial court properly found that Valdez's testimony would not render a different result 
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probable. (See Brief of Appellee at 17.)2 As discussed, supra, it was improper for the court 
to assess the credibility of Valdez's testimony, and it is for the jury to decide which side the 
testimony supports. Therefore, Defendant will respond to the State's argument that the 
Valdez testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence. 
The State claims that "[although Valdez's testimony supports defendant's contention 
that the victim is a violent person who intended to fight defendant (R. 1255:88), that 
testimony is cumulative because other evidence in the case had already established that fact, 
without dispute." (Brief of Appellee at 17.) This argument fails for two reasons. First of 
all, there was no evidence from an Hispanic or Mexican witness making such claims. 
Testimony coming from a witness of the same race and similar gang affiliation as the victim 
is different in kind and quality than the other testimonies presented and would likely have 
been very persuasive to the jury. Second, in addition to Valdez's testimony regarding the 
victim's propensity toward violence, Valdez would testify that he was personally asked by 
the victim himself to help him "down" or "kill" a white man. (R. 800-01, 804-05, 830.) 
There was absolutely no evidence of anyone being specifically recruited by the victim to kill 
2The three reasons are: "(1) the testimony was cumulative; (2) the testimony was 
not credible; and (3) the testimony also supported the prosecution." (Brief of Appellee at 
17) (citing to R. 1255:89, 1256:69-70). Any problems with the credibility of the evidence 
could be pointed out by the State on cross examination. Furthermore, as noted above, 
absent any evidence to the contrary, the facts contained in the Valdez statements must be 
deemed true. 
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the Defendant presented to the jury during the trial. For these reasons, it cannot be said that 
Valdez's testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence. 
Therefore, because it is not merely cumulative of other evidence and would be 
significant if the jury were to find the testimony credible, it is reasonably probable that it 
would render a different result in a new trial. 
3, Robert Young's DUI Charge and Subsequent Leniency, 
The State maintains that Robert Young was not given leniency in exchange for his 
testimony at the trial. (See Brief of Appellee at 24-25.) However, even assuming, arguendo, 
that this is true, the new evidence of Mr. Young's DUI charge and subsequent leniency 
supports an inference that even if leniency was not formally offered, Mr. Young had an 
incentive to offer favorable testimony. (R. 823-26.) In fact, the State admits as much. "Prior 
to defendant's trial, Young approached the prosecutor and requested leniency in exchange 
for his testimony. The prosecutor refused his request, but offered to call the Salt Lake City 
prosecutor's office and let them know of Young's cooperation if he appeared and testified 
at defendant's trial." (Brief of Appellee at 25.) Given the great weight that the jury and the 
judge placed on his testimony, it could have been instrumental to the jury in determining 
whether Mr. Young was indeed telling the truth.3 Hence, the evidence being newly 
3Mr. Young provided the only evidence that the Defendant was not acting in self 
defense when he stabbed the victim, testifying that the victim was backing up with his 
hands up. (R. 1251:229-31.) This testimony may have also been construed by the jury to 
support the assertion of Defendant that the victim's hands went up only after he was 
stabbed, especially if the jury found Mr. Young to be untrustworthy. 
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discovered, not merely cumulative and likely to render a different result in the minds of the 
jury, it justifies granting a new trial. 
The above evidence, especially when considered collectively, strongly undermines 
confidence in the jury's verdict. Had the jury been presented with the new evidence, there 
is a reasonable probability that they would have reached a different result. This Court should 
remand this case for a new trial with all of the new evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
The State alleges that Defendant waived any right to have the jury instructed on the 
lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The State would have this Court believe that 
Defendant made an informed, strategic decision not to have the jury instructed on the lesser 
offense of manslaughter. In support of its assertion, the State relies on some off-the-record 
discussion with counsel during which Defendant's counsel allegedly stated that Defendant 
would not request a lesser offense instruction. However, the record is void of any evidence 
that Defendant knowingly decided not to instruct the jury on the lesser offense. To the 
contrary, the record contains an instruction actually submitted by Defendant instructing the 
jury that if they are unable to find him guilty of the offense charged but feel he is guilty of 
a lesser offense, they should convict him of that lesser offense. (R. 113.) Such an instruction 
cannot be considered a waiver, but rather a clear intent that the jury be instructed regarding 
a lesser-included offense. 
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The State maintains that the proposed instruction referenced above is insufficient to 
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter because it doesn't describe 
the elements of the crime of manslaughter and is too vague. (See Brief of Appellee at 27.) 
The State further maintains that because the Defendant failed to object to the instructions, 
he cannot challenge them now on appeal. (See id.) However, the State's argument is 
premised on the assumption that Defendant did not in fact request the lesser offense 
instruction, which is contradicted by the record.4 Furthermore, while failure to object to jury 
instructions normally waives any later challenge to the instructions, such is not the case with 
a lesser offense instruction. Defendant had a constitutional right to the lesser offense 
instruction. Any waiver of this constitutional right must be made knowingly and 
intentionally, with a full understanding of the possible consequences of the waiver. See State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986). Finally, as the State correctly points out, this 
Court can assign error to the failure to instruct the jury, even in the absence of an objection, 
in order to avoid "manifest injustice." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 19(c). 
A. Defendant had a Constitutional Right to the Lesser Offense Instruction, 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has a due process 
right, protected by the federal constitution, to have the jury instructed on lesser included 
offenses so long as the instruction is supported by the evidence. In Beck v. Alabama, 447 
4As discussed more fully below, if the lesser offense instruction was not requested, 
this bolsters Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument, given the fact that 
Defendant's entire defense was based on his belief in a legal justification for his 
actions—precisely what the lesser offense instruction would have expounded to the jury. 
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U.S. 625 (1980), the Supreme Court discussed the due process concerns when a defendant 
is deprived of the right to a lesser offense instruction. Specifically, the Court discussed 
concerns about undermining the reasonable doubt standard, reducing the reliability of the 
factfinding process, and risking fundamental unfairness. See id. at 633-37, 642-45. The 
Court stated that a criminal defendant's due process rights are hindered "by substantially 
increasing the risk of error in the factfinding process" and creating a danger that the jury 
"will resolve any doubts in favor of conviction." Id. at 632. The Court went on to say that 
"[t]o expect a jury... to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of some ... crime requires of our juries 
clinical detachment from the reality of human experience." Id. at 642.5 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the due process concerns surrounding 
the failure to provide a lesser offense instruction in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156-57 
(Utah 1983), when it discussed the Beck, Keeble, and Hopper cases. The court stated that 
the right to a lesser offense instruction is not absolute or unqualified, but must be supported 
by the evidence at trial and that "a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction ... 
5See also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973) (reasoning, 
theoretically, jury given choices only of conviction and acquittal should acquit if evidence 
fails to prove an element of crime charged, but in practice, a substantial risk exists that 
jury will resolve its doubts in favor of conviction when defendant seems guilty of some 
serious crime); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 609-12 (1982) (stating "due process 
requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given" and holding only limitation 
on due process requirement to provide a lesser offense instruction is that instruction be 
supported by evidence presented). 
104792.SA512.001 13 
precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will 
diverge from theory." Id. at. 156-57 (quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-13). Thus, where the 
evidence would support a lesser offense instruction, due process requires that the instruction 
be given. 
This is not to say that a criminal defendant cannot ever waive this constitutional right, 
as the State has argued. However, because it is a constitutional right, any waiver of the right 
must be made distinctly and on the record. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 
(1970) (stating: "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences") (citation omitted); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) 
("[C]ourts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional 
rights.") (citation omitted). In this case, the record is void of any finding that the Defendant 
intentionally and knowingly waived his right to the instruction and understood the 
consequences of such a decision. 
Moreover, the State's argument that the failure of Defendant's counsel to object to the 
jury instructions constitutes a waiver of the instruction lacks merit when considering a lesser 
offense instruction which holds constitutional ramifications. 
A presumption that defendant's counsel will always inform him 
of the relevant factors in a decision to waive constitutional rights 
amounts to a rule that all waivers made after the defendant has 
retained counsel necessarily will be considered voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent. Such a rule offends common sense and 
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impermissibly strips a defencant of constitutional protections 
long recognized by this Court. 
Robertson v. California, 493 U.S. 879, 881 (1989) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). Defendant's trial counsel's failure to object on the record to the lack of a lesser 
offense instruction cannot constitute a knowing, intentional waiver on the part of Defendant. 
In fact, Defendant has submitted his own affidavit stating that the decision of whether to 
ultimately request a lesser offense instruction was never discussed with him.6 (R. 786,1013.) 
Because the failure to give a lesser offense instruction offended the fundamental fairness and 
Defendant's right to due process in the trial, he was entitled to such an instruction, and absent 
a clear, intentional waiver of the right, the instruction should have been given. 
B, The Lesser Offense Instruction was Required in Order to Avoid Manifest 
Injustice. 
The State urges that the "manifest injustice" rule does not apply in this case "because 
defendant explicitly rejected the court's invitation to submit a lesser-included instruction." 
(Brief of Appellee at 29.) The State would have this Court believe that the trial court made 
some explicit invitation to the Defendant to submit a lesser offense instruction, to which the 
Defendant responded negatively. The State, however, fails to point to any such invitation 
by the court and subsequent rejection by the Defendant because such an exchange never 
occurred. The State's argument rests entirely on the self-serving affidavit of Defendant's 
6As the United States Supreme Court stated in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 
(1970), "courts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against the loss of 
constitutional rights." 
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trial counsel which states that counsel discussed the possibility of a lesser offense instruction 
with Defendant but Defendant did not want the instruction. (See Brief of Appellee at 32-33, 
citing Moffat Aff, R. 888, [^18.) Defendant, however, maintains that he was never given the 
opportunity to consider the lesser offense instruction and the ramifications of counsel's 
failure to request such an instruction. (See R. 786, 1013.)7 
As stated in Defendant's brief and above, the United States Supreme Court has held, 
and the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated, that the right to a lesser offense instruction has 
constitutional ramifications and the only limitation on this right is the evidence itself. See 
supra, Part II.A; State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983). Therefore, if the 
evidence supports the instruction, whether requested or not, any waiver of this constitutional 
right must be made distinctly and on the record, not based upon some self-serving statement 
by defense counsel to avoid embarrassment. 
For the reasons set forth above, it would constitute a manifest injustice to allow the 
Defendant to be deprived of the constitutional right to the lesser offense instruction absent 
a clear, knowing and intentional waiver of the right. Moreover, given the extent of the 
7
 The State further maintains that Defendant's claim that the lesser included 
instruction was never discussed with him "is not credible and was impliedly rejected by 
the trial court." (Brief of Appellee at 33 n.7.) However, Defendant's statement is just as, 
if not more, credible than the self-serving affidavit of counsel relying on some off-the-
record discussion with the court. Moreover, the trial court did not reject Defendant's 
claim but merely stated that if counsel consulted with the Defendant regarding the lesser 
offense instruction, it was an appropriate trial tactic. If this presumed consultation never 
actually occurred, as Defendant maintains, then the trial court's conclusion is severely 
undermined. 
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evidence regarding self-defense presented at trial, there is a great probability that the jury 
would have convicted the Defendant of the lesser offense if given the choice. See Beck, 447 
U.S. at 642 (stating "[t]o expect a jury ... to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him 
free when the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of some ... 
crime requires of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience.") 
III. DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL. 
The State has argued that the trial court correctly found that "defendant's attorneys 
acted reasonably in investigating and presenting the evidence." (Brief of Appellee at 34.) 
However, the trial court merely found that "counsel pursued diligently the leads that were 
presented and the resources that were available to expend," (R. 1255:87), and said nothing 
about whether defense counsel acted reasonably in presenting the evidence. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that defense counsel reasonably investigated the leads available, several items 
which defense counsel has now claimed were discovered were never presented to the jury. 
For example, trial defense counsel avers that the evidence of the "SUR" tattoo and the DUI 
charge and request for leniency of Robert Young were known by him prior to trial, (Moffat 
Aff, R. 887-88), yet none of this evidence was presented to the jury. In addition, if, as the 
State now claims, a lesser offense instruction was in fact not requested or waived by defense 
counsel, such a failure to protect Defendant's right to due process certainly falls below any 
reasonable standard of professional judgment and should not be deemed a rational trial 
strategy. 
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A. Defense Counsel's Failure to Present Evidence Allegedly Within their 
Possession. 
The State alleges that evidence of Mr. Young's DUI charge and his request for 
leniency was known by defense counsel prior to trial. (Brief of Appellee at 25) (citing to 
Moffat Aff., R. 888.) They further claim that defense counsel' 'chose not to impeach Young 
with this information because counsel felt that the jury would only have been offended by 
such an attack on an uninvolved witness." (Brief of Appellee at 25) (citing to R. 888.) Such 
a choice was made without consultation with Defendant and clearly falls below any 
reasonable standard of professional judgment. 
Robert Young was the only witness that provided any evidence that Defendant might 
not have been acting in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. Mr. Young testified that 
he saw the victim backing away from the Defendant with his hands up before the Defendant 
stabbed him. (R. 1251: 226-34.) No other witness provided similar testimony despite 
several of them being in very close proximity to the incident. The decision not to impeach 
Mr. Young regarding his bias and incentives to provide the most favorable testimony 
possible for the prosecution was clearly not a reasonable one. Mr. Young provided the only 
eyewitness testimony which, if believed, may contradict the Defendant's theory that he 
needed to defend himself. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Moffat characterized Mr. Young as "an uninvolved witness" in 
attempting to explain why they did not impeach him with the information surrounding his 
DUI charge and request for leniency. (R. 888.) However, this "uninvolved witness" was 
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providing the strongest evidence which supported the conviction of their client and Defense 
counsel should have employed every means to impeach his testimony which was wholly 
inconsistent with the Defendant's. If the information was available, it should have been 
utilized. If utilized, the jury may well have found Mr. Young's testimony to be unreliable 
and found Defendant's theory more believable, thereby acquitting him. The failure to utilize 
the information to impeach Mr. Young falls below the standard of reasonableness. 
Furthermore, if defense counsel knew of the "SUR" and star tattoos on the victim's 
body, evidence of gang affiliation, such evidence should have been investigated further and 
presented to the jury. Evidence of formal gang affiliation would have been significant in 
supporting the Defendant's theory of self-defense and that the victim did indeed have backup 
on that day. The State maintains that "[a]t the time of trial, no one was aware of the victim's 
gang affiliation or of the significance of the victim's tattoos." (Brief of Appellee at 35.) 
However, the reason no one knew of the specific ties to the Surenos street gang is because 
counsel failed to investigate the matter. As demonstrated by the affidavit of Officer Chuck 
Gilbert, the evidence was there to be discovered. 
Any supposed "tactical decision" not to impeach Mr. Young, the State's key witness, 
or present and investigate the victim's gang affiliation, falls below the standard of 
reasonableness in this case. This is especially true given the weight that the jury must have 
placed on Mr. Young's testimony and the lack of weight on the Defendant's. It is very likely 
that if the jury knew of this evidence they would have believed, as the Defendant did, that 
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it was necessary for him to defend himself against the victim and others. The failure to 
present this evidence "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 
524, 533 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)). 
B. Defense Counsel's Failure to Request a Lesser Offense Instruction. 
If, as the State maintains, defense counsel did not request a lesser offense instruction 
or waived the instruction, such a failure falls below the standard of reasonableness in this 
case. The State relies on several cases for the proposition that the decision not to request a 
lesser offense instruction is a reasonable trial tactic. {See Brief of Appellee at 30-33 and 
cases cited therein). However, each case relied upon by the State was decided prior to the 
Utah Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), and State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998), which affirmed the United States Supreme 
Court's due process principles in Beck and its progeny discussed above. 
Given the important nature of a lesser offense instruction and its constitutional 
significance, the cases relied on by the State are highly speculative. Defense counsel should 
have made sure that the Defendant understood the nature of the lesser offense instruction and 
the possible consequences of not requesting the instruction. Even if the decision not to 
request a lesser offense instruction may be considered a reasonable trial tactic in some cases, 
because it involves a due process right, the decision should be made with full knowledge of 
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the consequences and the trial court should find specific evidence on the record 
demonstrating such a decision. (See supra, part II.A, and cases cited therein.) 
In State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ffif 22-37, 984 P.2d 376, the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a cautionary 
instruction regarding eyewitness testimony. In that case, the only defense available to the 
defendant was the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. See id. at f 25. The Supreme 
Court found that "trial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to 
request a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction that would have informed the jury 
of the unreliability of eyewitness identifications." Id. at Tf 32. Finally, because the Court did 
"not find the other evidence supporting the conviction conclusive," and "counsel's omission 
went to the heart of the defense," the failure to request the instruction "seriously undermined 
the fairness of [the] trial." Id. at ^f 34-35. Thus, the deficiency sufficiently prejudiced the 
defendant and the Court granted a new trial. See id. at U 37. 
Similarly, in this case Defendant's trial counsel was objectively deficient in failing 
to impeach the State's key eyewitness despite knowledge of the witness's request for 
leniency and DUI charge and failing to request a lesser offense jury instruction. Because the 
other evidence presented at trial was so inconclusive regarding the Defendant's state of mind 
at the time of the incident, it was critical that Mr. Young be impeached in any possible way. 
Had the jury heard such evidence, they may have been less inclined to believe Mr. Young's 
testimony and may have returned a verdict of not guilty as a result. Moreover, counsel's 
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omission to request a lesser offense instruction goes to the very heart of the defense—that 
the Defendant reasonably felt he needed to defend himself from severe bodily harm and even 
death when he stabbed the victim. Such omissions seriously undermined the fairness of the 
trial and Defendant should, therefore, be granted a new trial. 
IV. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
The State argues that the prosecutor did not fail to disclose exculpatory evidence, but 
rather, "the prosecutor provided defendant with access to every witness statement and report 
in the case." (Brief of Appellee at 44.) However, nowhere does the record indicate that the 
prosecutor disclosed the name and statement of Gilmar Pinelo, who accompanied the victim 
during the altercation with the Defendant. Such information could have been critical to the 
defense where Pinelo was an active participant in the altercation. Moreover, other than the 
post-trial affidavit of Defendant's trial counsel, the record is void of evidence that the 
coroner's report, several eyewitness statements and the fact that Mr. Young requested 
leniency on his DUI charge in exchange for his testimony were actually produced to the 
Defendant prior to trial. 
To the contrary, the record shows that the Defendant complained several times that 
he did not receive several items of exculpatory evidence which came to his attention after the 
trial was concluded. (R. 410-11,425-26, 511-39, 642-47.) Moreover, in response to several 
of the Defendant's discovery requests, the State responded: "Your general request for 
discovery cannot be honored pursuant to State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)." (R. 32, 
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55.) However, the Defendant's due process right to be provided with all exculpatory 
evidence, whether requested or not, overrides and is not inconsistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding in Knight. Knight only stands for the proposition that the state need not 
voluntarily disclose "evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be 
made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense" 
absent a court order. Knight, 734 P.2d at 916 (quoting UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16). Where the 
prosecution is in possession of exculpatory evidence that may support the defendant's case, 
however, it must disclose such information. {See Brief of Appellant at 39-41 and cases cited 
therein). 
V, DEFENDANT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE SHIMMIIIII IMi« I IIS 
CONVICTION IN HIS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM, 
In its brief, the State argues that the Defendant's insufficiency of evidence claim fails 
because the Defendant failed to marshal the evidence supporting his conviction. {See Brief 
of Appellee at 46-48.) Specifically, the State alleges that "defendant has wholly failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting his conviction." {Id. at 47.) However, the State fails to 
acknowledge that the Defendant set forth completely all the evidence supporting his 
conviction in his statement of the facts. {See Brief of Appellant at 4-8.) In order to preserve 
space and time, Defendant did not recount in argument the same facts which were already 
put forth in his statement of facts. Thus, for the reasons set forth in Appellant's brief, the 
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support the conviction for criminal 
homicide murder. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant Defendant a new trial. The nature and extent 
of the newly discovered evidence, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser offense, trial 
counsel's neglectful representation and the prosecution's failure to disclose important 
exculpatory evidence combine to seriously undermine the fairness of the Defendant's trial. 
Moreover, given the amount and character of the evidence supporting the Defendant's self-
defense theory, it is not possible that the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that he did not reasonably believe that he needed to defend his life when he stabbed the 
victim. Therefore, Defendant respectfully urges this Court to grant Defendant a new trial. 
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